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Abstract—
Vehicular Ad-hoc NETwork (VANET) is a vital transportation
technology that facilitates the vehicles to share sensitive informa-
tion (such as steep-curve warnings and black ice on the road) with
each other and with the surrounding infrastructure in real-time
to avoid accidents and enable comfortable driving experience.
To achieve these goals, VANET requires a secure environment
for authentic, reliable and trusted information dissemination
among the network entities. However, VANET is prone to differ-
ent attacks resulting in the dissemination of compromised/false
information among network nodes. One way to manage a secure
and trusted network is to introduce trust among the vehicular
nodes. To this end, various Trust Models (TMs) are developed
for VANET and can be broadly categorized into three classes,
Entity-oriented Trust Models (ETM), Data oriented Trust Models
(DTM) and Hybrid Trust Models (HTM). These TMs evaluate
trust based on the received information (data), the vehicle (entity)
or both through different mechanisms. In this paper, we present a
comparative study of the three TMs. Furthermore, we evaluate
these TMs against the different trust, security and quality-of-
service related benchmarks. Simulation results revealed that all
these TMs have deficiencies in terms of end-to-end delays, event
detection probabilities and false positive rates. This study can be
used as a guideline for researchers to design new efficient and
effective TMs for VANET.
Keywords—Trust Models, Internet-of-Things, Smart Cities,
Intelligent Transportation Systems, Vehicular Ad-hoc Network
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, Internet-of-Things (IoT) has evolved as an innova-
tive computing technology connecting billions of devices with
the Internet, thus resulting in numerous applications including
smart cities, smart transportation, smart e-healthcare and smart
industries [1]. Vehicular Ad-hoc NETwork (VANET) is a
fundamentally important transportation technology, comple-
mented by IoT, and is poised to improve traffic efficiency and
safety. In VANET, vehicles equipped with different sensors,
computation, and communication technologies which intel-
ligently share sensitive and life-saving information such as
accident-avoidance, steep-curve or black-ice warnings with
each other and with the infrastructure. There are fundamentally
three modes of communication in VANET, i.e., Vehicle-to-
Vehicle (V2V), Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I), and hybrid [2].
Ideally, information generated by the source vehicle must
be shared with its neighbouring vehicles without any alteration
to its content. However, vehicles highly rely on node-to-node
communication in VANET, thus allowing the propagation of
malicious traffic generated by dishonest vehicles. Due to the
sensitive nature of the information involved in VANET, a
secure and trustworthy environment is essential. However,
ensuring security in VANET is very challenging due to its
perceptivity to the wide range of attacks such as man-in-the-
middle, Sybil, black-hole or denial-of-service [3]–[5].
To date, various solutions are proposed in the literature
to guarantee VANET security. Recently, trust management
is introduced as an efficient technique to secure VANET
by creating a trusted environment for message propagation
among vehicles. In the context of VANET, trust is defined
as the confidence which one vehicle places in another, for
the accomplishment of the desired action. Trust in the in-
formation can be calculated by vehicles based on various
factors including neighbours’ opinions, vehicles’ reputation
and their past interaction with the communicating vehicle [6].
However, due to the highly unpredictable mobility of vehicles,
communication is short-lived and intermittent. Evaluating the
trustworthiness of the critical message (such as steep-curve
warnings) in such limited time-frame is very difficult and
challenging.
Recently, various Trust Models (TMs) are proposed to eval-
uate the trustworthiness and authenticity of the disseminated
messages in VANET. VANET integrates two revocation targets
for trust management, i.e., (1) data and (2) entity. Based on
these targets, TMs are broadly categorized into three classes,
i.e., entity-oriented, data-oriented and hybrid trust models as
depicted in Figure 1 [7], [8]. Entity-oriented Trust Models
(ETMs) aim at excluding adversaries from the network by
calculating trust values for the nodes (entities). Data-oriented
Trust Models (DTMs), on the other hand, assess the trust
of the shared messages (data), and, Hybrid Trust Models
(HTMs) merge the properties of both DTM and ETM for trust
management [9].
The existing TMs proposed in VANET can be placed
under one of the above mentioned TM categories. These
trust categories evaluate the trustworthiness of data or vehicle
through different techniques. For instance, ETM mostly eval-
uates the trustworthiness of the received information based
on the reputation of the vehicles, while DTM relies on the
opinion provided by the neighbours. On the other hand, HTM











Fig. 1: Categories of Trust Models in VANET
opinion. This paper provides a detailed comparative analysis
of the TMs by utilizing a simulation-based approach. The
contribution of this paper is threefold. (1) We provided a
detailed comparison of TMs which are designed solely for
safety applications in VANET. (2) We presented a simulation-
based study where we implemented and evaluated three TMs,
one from each category of TM. (3) We evaluate these TMs
in the presence of adversaries based on different realistic trust
evaluation criteria.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
explains the related TMs in VANET. Section III provides the
explanation of the compared TMs, while, simulation environ-
ment, trust metrics and simulation results are explained in
Section IV. We conclude the paper in Section V.
II. TRUST MANAGEMENT IN VANET
In VANET, TMs are usually integrated within the vehicles
to identify dishonest vehicles and their malicious content.
As aforementioned, TMs are classified into DTM, ETM, and
HTM. In this section, we outline some of the relevant TMs in
VANET.
A. Data-oriented Trust Models (DTM)
As the name suggests, “data” is the important component
in these TMs, where trust on the message (data) is computed
based on the opinions generated by the neighbouring vehicles
or previous interactions among the peers. Various DTM are
proposed by researchers recently.
Raya et al. proposed a DTM, where Bayesian Inference (BI)
and Dempster Shafer Theory (DST) are utilized to evaluate the
evidence on the received events from neighbourhood [10]. This
TM operates in three major phases. First, reports produced by
the neighbouring vehicles are accumulated by the evaluator
node (EVN). Second, EVN assigns weights to the received
reports which depend on the spatiotemporal properties of the
event. Third, EVN forwards these reports to a decision logic
module where BI and DST are utilized for trust calculation.
The limitation of this technique is that trust is calculated based
on the received data at the EVN , making it inefficient for a
network with high mobility.
A tier-based and analytic approach is adapted by Gazdar et
al. where vehicles continuously evaluate the trustworthiness of
the received data based on their direct experiences [11]. In this
TM, trust is evaluated for every participating vehicle where the
main purpose is to identify the pool of highly trusted vehicles
and dishonest vehicles based on the data exchanged. Each
vehicle maintains a trust table for its neighbours. Trust value
is incremented for messages received from trusted vehicles,
while it is decremented for malicious vehicles. This technique
is efficient in identifying malicious vehicles as it only involves
direct experiences of the participating vehicles. However, the
scope of this TM is limited as it does not include any
recommendations from honest vehicles regarding the event
trustworthiness.
Wu et al. presented a centralized trust modelling framework
for the evaluation of data by exploiting the advantages of
adjacent infrastructure, Road-Side Unit (RSU) [12]. Trust is
calculated at RSU based on two factors: 1) observation and 2)
feedback. Vehicles detect an event and generate observations
along with their confidence which depends on the distance
from the event, its maximum message detection rate and the
number of embedded sensors detecting the event. This obser-
vation is then shared with RSU which updates the recently
observed event list. RSU evaluates the trustworthiness of the
received observation by applying trust on it using the ant-
colony optimization algorithm. This updated trust information
is then distributed by RSU with vehicles in its vicinity.
However, this approach fails in rural areas as it heavily relies
on adjacent infrastructure for trust calculation.
B. Entity-oriented Trust Models (ETM)
Unlike DTMs, ETMs adopt a different technique to identify
dishonest vehicles in the network. In ETM, trustworthiness is
evaluated for the entity (vehicle). These TMs depend heavily
on neighbouring vehicles that endorse recommendation about
sender to the EVN . To date, various ETMs have been pro-
posed in the literature. For example, Khan et al. leveraged
a cluster-based technique where Cluster Head (CH) is first
elected and is liable for evaluating trust in the network [14].
In this TM, CH implements a watchdog mechanism where
vehicles in its vicinity provide reports of the presence of the
misbehaving vehicle. Upon detection of such vehicles, CH
then informs the trusted authority (TA) who are responsible for
the revocation of these vehicles in order to maintain a trusted
network. However, the major constraint in this approach is the
communication overhead incurred by message exchange with
CH and thus reducing the efficiency of the overall network.
Similarly, Yang proposed a TM by adapting a similarity
mining approach for trust calculation [15]. EVN upon receiv-
ing the message from vehicles, calculate similarity among the
received messages based on Euclidean distance, and reputation
of the transmitting vehicle. Since trust is calculated using
Euclidean distances locally at EVN , this TM fails to provide
any global information on the similarity of the messages.
Marmol et al. presented a centralized ETM, where trust
management technique relies on the adjacent infrastructure
TABLE I: Comparison of Trust Models
Trust Model Category Trust Models Approach Trust Computation TechniqueCentralized Distributed
Data-oriented
Trust Models
Raya et al. [10] X BI and DST based trust evaluations
Gazdar et al. [11] X Direct trust calculations and evaluations
Wu et al. [12] X Observation and feedback
Kerrache et al. [13] X Evaluation based on message classification
Entity-oriented
Trust Models
Khan et al. [14] X Clustering alongside watchdog mechanism
Yang [15] X Similarity mining approach
Minhas et al. [16] X Multi-faceted trust management
Marmol et al. [17] X Fuzzy-logic trust computation
Hybrid
Trust Models
Ahmed et al. [18] X Weighted voting and logistic regression
Shretha et al. [19] X Clustering and random walk
Chen et al. [20] X Attack-resistant trust model based on DST
Dhurandher et al. [21] X Reputation-based trust management
[17]. Upon receiving a message from neighbours, EVN
computes a fuzzy-based trust score which depends on three
sources: (1) recommendation provided by adjacent RSU, (2)
recommendation given by neighbouring vehicles, and (3)
previous reputation of the sender vehicle. Once the trust score
at EVN is calculated, decision about the message is taken
based on following three conditions: (1) Drop the message if
not trustworthy (no trust), (2) accept the message but do not
forward (+/- trust), and (3) accept the message and forward it
(trust). Further, messages are also classified into three levels
depending on their severity, i.e., high, medium and low. High-
level messages are accepted only from the vehicles placed in
‘trust’ group. The other groups ‘no trust’ and ‘+/- trust’ accept
only medium and low-level messages. Due to its reliance on
infrastructure for trust computation, this TM may not perform
well in rural areas due to limited infrastructure.
C. Hybrid Trust Models (HTM)
HTMs assess the credibility of both vehicles and the ex-
changed information. In other words, the trust of the data is
calculated by taking advantage of the vehicle’s trust. However,
these TMs incur high computation overhead as a result of
many control messages must be evaluated in a limited time.
In the following, we outline existing HTMs.
Ahmed et al. proposed an HTM where a logistic-based
trust computation is utilized to identify nodes injecting false
information within the network [18]. In this TM, EVN di-
rectly observes the events. As a result, when messages are
shared by the neighbouring vehicles, EVN can identify the
trustworthiness of the events. Once the true event is identified,
this information is then used to classify the behaviour of the
sender node as legitimate or malicious. EVN computes trust
through weighted voting and logistic trust function. This TM is
efficient in identifying dishonest vehicles that propagate wrong
information. However, the major limitation of this TM is its
dependence on weighted voting which can be biased in case
of majority of dishonest vehicles.
Another HTM is proposed by Shrestha et al. which cal-
culates trust on the vehicles in a fully distributed manner
[19]. The trust is calculated in two steps, i.e., trust is eval-
uated for the vehicle while and the second step involves
trust calculations for the information. Trust is achieved by
employing a clustering algorithm where honest and dishonest
vehicles are classified into two separate groups to identify
the trustworthiness of the neighbouring nodes. Next, EVN ’s
trust in the received message is evaluated using the modified
threshold random walk algorithm. The main drawback of this
scheme is the assumption of uniform distribution of dishonest
nodes in the network [22]. This assumption might not be
true in VANET as malicious vehicles are randomly distributed
across the network.
To enhance user privacy in the network, Chen et al. pre-
sented a beacon-based HTM combining the characteristics of
both ETM and DTM [20]. Trust is calculated in two steps.
First, entity trust is established based on the received beacons.
Next, data trust is calculated based on various plausibility
checks to identify and revoke dishonest vehicles along with
their malicious content. This TM highly depends on Public
Key Infrastructure (PKI) and the central authority for their
trust evaluation, which makes it inefficient due to the high
overheads added to each forwarded message.
In a nutshell, we can see that a wide range of TMs are
designed in VANET as depicted in Table I. According to
our literature review, there is a lack of comparative study of
different TMs in VANET. Therefore, to fill this gap, we present
a comparative study of these TMs.
III. DETAILS OF THE COMPARED TRUST MODELS
In this section, we outline in detail, the TMs considered
for comparison in VANET. For this paper, we chose three
particular TMs, i.e., one from each category.
A. DTM
In this paper, we implemented a DTM, presented by Ker-
rache et al. [13]. In this TM, EVN calculates trust through
two traditional methods: direct trust (Tdir) and indirect trust
(Tind). Tdir relies on the quality of the received information
while Tind is established using a broadcast/drop ratio from the
sending vehicle.
Let message is received at vehicle Vx from vehicle Vy , then
the overall trust (Trust(x,y)) at the Vx (which acts as EVN





Tdir × Tind (1)
Tdir relies on the quality of the received message. Tdir is
updated with a factor of α (honesty reward) for every message
satisfying the minimum trust threshold level. However, Tdir
is decremented with factor β (punishment factor) if it falls
below this trust threshold point. Let, Broadcast(x, y) and
Drop(x, y) are the broadcasted and dropped packets by the
transmitter, respectively. Then, Tind is given by:
Tind(x, y) =
Broadcast(x, y)
Broadcast(x, y) +Drop(x, y)
(2)
Once Tdir and Tind are identified, EVN calculates the
overall trust. The message is accepted only if the overall trust
is above the threshold, it is discarded, otherwise.
B. ETM
We consider Minhas et al.’s ETM where a multi-faceted
approach is utilized for trust modelling [16]. Trust calculation
on the entity is accumulated using the message producer’s ex-
perience, priority, role and the majority opinions of the neigh-
bours. In this TM, EVN first employs two trust management
mechanisms in the network, i.e., role-based, and experienced-
based, and the vehicles are prioritized in the neighbourhood
based on these criteria. EVN then shares the messages with
these vehicles and awaits their acknowledgement. Based on
the location and time closeness, these prioritized vehicles
send their opinions back to EVN . Upon receiving opinions,
EVN employs a majority decree for trust evaluation. EVN
accepts the message if the majority agrees about the event
trustworthiness, otherwise, EVN follows the advice provided
by vehicles with higher experience and the highest role.
Role-based trust (Trole) has central importance in this TM.
Every network mostly includes vehicles authorized from the
higher and central authorities. Trole represents the generation
of messages from such highly trusted vehicles. These include
police vehicles, buses and taxis etc. It also includes vehicles
with professional drivers having higher driving experience in
the network.
On the other hand, experience-based trust (Texp) is cal-
culated for vehicles with no roles. As the behaviour of the
vehicles usually changes over time, therefore, Texp incorpo-
rates a forgetting factor (λ) for trust calculation to minimize
the effect of old interactions. When a legitimate message is




(λ)t(1− α)Texp + α if Texp ≥ TThr
(λ)−t(1− α)Texp + α if Texp < TThr
(3)




(λ)t(1− β)Texp − β if Texp ≥ TThr
(λ)−t(1− β)Texp − β if Texp < TThr
(4)
In equations 3 & 4, α is the honesty reward awarded to the
message generator for providing true information, while, β is
the punishment factor in case of malicious content. Further, t
is the time closeness factor.
Once trust and distrust are accumulated by EVN , then a
majority rule is employed by EVN . The message is accepted
if maximum vehicles agree with the event trustworthiness,
otherwise, the advice from the vehicle having the highest
experience and role in the network is followed.
C. HTM
In this paper, we consider an event-oriented HTM called
Vehicular Security through Reputation and Plausibility checks
(VSRP) and implement it for comparison with the rest of the
TMs [21]. The main component of this TM is the reputation-
based trust management which can be used for the identifica-
tion and isolation of the dishonest vehicles from the network.
Following four steps are performed at the EVN :
1) Discovering Neighbors: First, EVN identifies neighbors
in its vicinity by broadcasting neighbourreq packets. Vehicles
upon receiving neighbourreq, reply back to EVN with neigh-
bourrep. Then EVN performs initial checks on the neighbour
by consulting its trust table. EVN accepts the message if trust
table contains an entry with non-zero trust value, otherwise,
EVN revokes the message directly.
2) Dispatching Content: In this step, EVN transmits data
to the recognized neighbors.
3) Deciding Trust: In this phase, trust is calculated through
two important geographical factors. (1) threshold range, and
(2) detection range of the vehicle. EVN discards the message
if the sender is located outside the threshold range. In case
the sender is within the threshold range, another check is
performed by EVN using the detection range. EVN usually
has a clear line-of-sight to the event in the detection range
and EVN only accepts the received messages if the content
agrees with the point-of-view of the EVN . In this case, EVN
increments the trust value of the sender with an honesty
reward (α). In case of contradiction, EVN decreases the
trust level of the sender with punishment (β) and discards its
malicious content. However, if the sender is between detection
and threshold range, then EVN consults its neighbours for
message trustworthiness. EVN accepts messages only from
neighbours if it satisfies the minimum trust threshold level,
otherwise, the message is discarded and classified as mali-
cious.
4) Monitoring Neighbors: In VSRP, EVN crucially de-
pends on its neighbours for information collection. Therefore,
each vehicle in the network closely monitors its neighbouring
vehicles continuously. Depending on the exchanged messages,
EVN can determine the trustworthiness of the node and the
shared messages.
IV. EVALUATION OF TRUST MODELS
A. Simulation Setup
In this study, we have used OMNET++ (v5.0) and Veins
(v4.4), which are used broadly for the simulation of vehicular
networks [23]. Furthermore, a default map of Veins is used
with an area of about 2.5 × 2.5 km, where both legitimate
and dishonest vehicles are introduced in the network. We
considered the following two scenarios in Veins:
1) Scenario 1: Keeping the number of honest vehicles con-
stant and increasing the number of dishonest vehicles.
2) Scenario 2: Keeping the number of dishonest vehicles
constant and increasing the number of honest vehicles.
B. Attacker Model
To evaluate the efficiency of TMs, we designed a Man-
In-The-Middle (MITM) attacker model which is one of the
critical attacks in VANET [24]. We equipped the attacker with
two capabilities. First, the attacker can change the content of
the safety message. Second, the attacker can delay the safety
message. Since VANET involves very critical information
(e.g., accident avoidance messages), therefore, both of these
abilities of MITM attacker can cause catastrophic effects in
the network. Table II summarizes all the necessary simulation
details.
TABLE II: Simulation Details
Parameter Value
Simulation Details
Simulation Area (km × km) 2.5 × 2.5
No. of RSU 5
Communication Range 250 m
Total Simulation Time 1000 sec
Scenario 1
Total Honest Vehicles 100
Total Dishonest Vehicles (%) 10, 20, 30, 4050, 60, 70, 80
Scenario 2 Total Honest Vehicles
50, 100, 150,
200, 250, 300
Total Dishonest Vehicles (%) 10, 20
Protocols
MAC Protocol IEEE 802.11p
Network Protocol IEEE 1609.4
Radio Propagation Model Simple Path Loss
Data Size 1024 bits
Header Size 256 bits
Trust Model
Initial Trust (TInit) 0.5
Threshold (TThr) 0.5
Honesty Factor (α) 0.01
Punishment Factor (β) 0.1
Attacker Model Actions on Message
1) Tamper
2) Delay
Delay (d) 2 secs
Further, each simulation scenario is carried out twenty-five
times with random seed value to ensure unique initial vehicle
assignment within the network every time. Moreover, the
simulation results presented below are the average of twenty-
five runs for each simulation scenario.
C. Evaluation Metrics
We considered the following metrics for the evaluation of
TMs in VANET.
1) End-to-end Delay: The Quality of Service (QoS) related
criterion is defined to identify the delay introduced to packet
which is generated by the benign vehicles to be shared with the
neighboring vehicles. End-to-End (E2E) delay is the difference
of packet generation time (TGen) and packet reception time
(TRec) which is calculated as follows:
E2E delay = TRec − TGen (5)
2) Event Detection Probability (EDP): Identifying correct
events (messages) are of primary importance in VANET as
these messages contain sensitive information. To determine
such events within the network, we defined EDP. TMs should
have the capability to detect true events efficiently [25]. Let
ETot are the overall events generated in the network. ETrue
and EMal are true and malicious events respectively, then EDP






3) Trust: Trust is another important metric measuring the
trust values of the vehicles in the network. Based on this
trust, EVN either accepts or discards messages. For our
experimentation, we kept the trust threshold (TThr) to 0.5 to
accept messages. If the trust falls below this threshold, the
message is categorized as malicious and the trust of the sender
is decremented with the punishment factor (β). The message is
accepted only if the trust of the received message is higher than
the threshold and reward (α) is awarded to the honest vehicles
for their honesty. As trust of the vehicle is not easy to gain,
therefore, we assigned higher weights to the punishment, i.e.,
(β = 10× α). Moreover, we assigned the initial trust (TInit)
value of 0.5 to all the vehicles in order to deal with cold-start
problem [26]. Mathematically, Trust (T ) can be given as:
T =
{
T + α if T ≥ TThr
T − β if T < TThr
(7)
4) False Positive Rate (FPR): FPR illustrates the capability
of the TM to determine those dishonest vehicles which are
incorrectly detected as honest. The TMs with low FPR are
considered good. Let PDis|Hon describes the probability of
detecting vehicle as dishonest, given the vehicle is honest, and
PHon|Hon is the probability of detecting vehicle as honest,






1) Scenario 1: Figure 2 depicts E2E delay of three TMs
in the presence of dishonest vehicles. It can be observed
that among the three considered TMs, high E2E delay is
achieved for HTM, while ETM experiences lowest E2E delays.
There are two main reasons for this behaviour. First, ETM
incorporates role-based and experienced-based mechanisms to
revoke dishonest vehicles, thus enabling honest vehicles to
receive trusted information in time. Second, DTM and HTM
are based on data trust evaluation mechanism where data is
deliberately delayed by dishonest vehicles. Since, one of the
characteristics of the attacker model is to delay the messages
by factor d, as a result, network experiences high E2E delays.
This delay further increases when the number of adversaries
is increased within the network. Further, a network utilizing
ETM experiences low E2E delays than the network using
DTM and HTM. For instance, when a network contains 50%

























Fig. 2: End-to-End Delay vs. Malicious Nodes
malicious nodes then ETM achieves 21.58% less E2E delay
than DTM.
The ability of the TMs to determine true events can be
expressed by determining Event Detection probability (EDP).
Since two forms of messages propagate in the network, i,e,
(1) legitimate messages which are generated by the honest
vehicles, and (2) compromised messages which are generated
by attackers. Therefore, this metric is helpful in determining
the performance of TMs to detect true events. The capability
of three TMs to detect true event is illustrated by Figure 3,
showing that ETM can detect a high number of true events
than DTM and HTM. Since ETM integrates a role-based trust
model, therefore, there is a high probability that these vehicles
provide correct information, resulting in higher detection rates.
For instance, ETM and DTM detect 24.36% and 9.82% more
events correctly than HTM, if the network contains 50%
malicious vehicles.























Fig. 3: Event Detection Probability vs. Malicious Nodes
Figure 3 also depicts that EDP of the network decreases
when malicious vehicles are introduced in the network. Since
one aspect of the attacker model is to change the content of
the legitimate messages. Therefore, as the attack vector of
malicious vehicles increases in the network, the ability of TMs
to identify true messages decreases. In this regard, when the
adversaries are increased in the network from 10% to 80%,
EDP for ETM decreases from 97.21% to 24.02%, for DTM, it
jumps down from 91.09% to 1.722 %, while for HTM, EDP
declines from 88.60% to 1.38%.
Furthermore, Figure 4 shows the behaviour of the trust
metric in the network for different TMs in the presence of
dishonest vehicles. It can be seen that increasing the number
of malicious vehicles in the network decreases trust within the
network. In other words, the presence of malicious vehicles
decreases the propagation of trusted packets in the network.
Since the attacker model in our simulator is changing the
content of the packet before broadcasting, thus resulting in
the generation of compromised information in the network.
Moreover, the trust metric is behaving much better in ETM
than other TMs. As mentioned earlier, vehicles with the
highest roles ensure the propagation of authentic and trusted
messages in the network, thus achieving better trust values
than DTM.




















Fig. 4: Trust vs. Malicious Nodes
False positive rate (FPR) for the TMs is depicted in Figure
5. For VANET applications, FPR should be minimum. Lower
FPR values mean better TM. It can be seen that the TMs
achieve low FPR values (less than 4.5%), however, ETM
outperforms DTM and HTM in terms of FPR by ensuring
lower values. For 30% adversaries, ETM achieves about 54%
better FPR values than DTM. This is due to the fact that ETM
includes both experienced based and role-based vehicles, thus
increasing the probability of detecting false positives in the
network.






















Fig. 5: False Positive Rate vs. Malicious Nodes
2) Scenario 2: Figure 6 shows E2E delay for three TMs
when honest vehicles are increased in the network. It can be
seen that HTM and DTM achieve high E2E delays as compare
to ETM due to the fact that trust is evaluated for data which
may be delayed by the adversaries in the network. On the other
hand, role-based vehicles in the ETM ensure the revocation
of such adversaries from the network, thus creating a trusted
environment for message propagation. Further, increasing hon-
est vehicles in such a network will increase the probability of
disseminating trusted information among vehicular nodes. For
a network with 300 legitimate nodes, DTM achieves 11% and
19% higher E2E delay than ETM and HTM when it is polluted
with 10% and 20% malicious nodes, respectively.




















10% Attackers: Data-Oriented TM
20% Attackers: Data-Oriented TM
10% Attackers: Entity-Oriented TM
20% Attackers: Entity-Oriented TM
10% Attackers: Hybrid TM
20% Attackers: Hybrid TM
Fig. 6: End-to-End Delay vs. Legitimate Nodes
EDP of the TMs for increasing honest vehicles in the net-
work is depicted in Figure 7. EDP increases for all TMs when
honest vehicles are increased in the network. For instance,
the detection probability for ETM is increased from almost
92% to 97%, DTM detection probability is increased from
87% to 94% and for HTM, EDP increases from 82% to 89%
when honest vehicles are increased from 50 vehicles to 300
vehicles in existence of 20% malicious vehicles. Moreover,
ETM provides higher EDP than DTM and HTM. Since in this
experiment, the attacker is delaying and changing the content
of the packet. therefore, identifying and detecting true events
become difficult when malicious nodes are introduced in the
network.


















10% Attackers: Data-Oriented TM
20% Attackers: Data-Oriented TM
10% Attackers: Entity-Oriented TM
20% Attackers: Entity-Oriented TM
10% Attackers: Hybrid TM
20% Attackers: Hybrid TM
Fig. 7: Event Detection Probability vs. Legitimate Nodes
Figure 8 highlights the behaviour of trust metric when
honest vehicles with the TMs are increased in the network.
It can be seen that trust increases when the number of honest
vehicles is increased in the network. This is due to the fact
that more vehicles are available in the network to calculate
the trustworthiness which results in the identification and
revocation of dishonest vehicles and their malicious content.
Moreover, ETM achieves the highest trust than other TMs.
It is because of the presence of role-based authorities and
experienced-based trust in ETM. On the other hand, DTM
depends on the evaluation of the data for trustworthiness.
Since the attacker can tamper with the data, therefore, trust
decreases in DTM and HTM. It is worth mentioning that ETM
outperforms DTM by about 31.1% when the network contains
300 honest vehicles and 20% malicious vehicles.

















10% Attackers: Data-Oriented TM
20% Attackers: Data-Oriented TM
10% Attackers: Entity-Oriented TM
20% Attackers: Entity-Oriented TM
10% Attackers: Hybrid TM
20% Attackers: Hybrid TM
Fig. 8: Trust vs. Legitimate Nodes
Figure 9 depicts the FPR of all TMs. It can be seen
that TMs achieve less than 2% FPR values for 10% and
20% malicious vehicles. This means that these TMs have
the ability to detect the error margins by correctly detecting
malicious vehicles. FPR decreases when honest vehicles are
increased in the network. This is due to the fact that a
high number of legitimate nodes can detect more and more
legitimate messages correctly, resulting in fewer messages that
are incorrectly identified as legitimate messages. Moreover,
ETM performs better than DTM and HTM by achieving low
FPR values due to the presence of vehicles with the highest
roles in the network, thus resulting in less error in identifying
malicious vehicles.
V. CONCLUSION
A secure, privacy-aware and trusted environment is a pre-
requisite for the distribution and propagation of safety mes-
sages in VANET. In this regard, trust among the vehicles
ensures the dissemination of trusted messages in the network.
A wide range of TMs are proposed in different studies where
trust is calculated via different techniques. In this paper,
we provided a comparative study of three TMs from each
category, i.e., ETM, DTM and HTM. Further, we adopted
a simulation-based approach where the efficiency of these
TMs is evaluated against MITM attacks. Simulation results
indicated that ETM outperformed other TMs due to the
presence of role-based and experience-based trust techniques
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Fig. 9: False Positive Rate vs. Legitimate Nodes
which ensured the dissemination of trusted information among
vehicular entities. Further, the results also depicted that DTM
and HTM are more prone to MITM attacks.
This study can be used as a guideline by the researchers
in order to design new TMs. We conclude that the future
TMs should include role-based and experience-based trust
management techniques to provide a trusted environment for
message dissemination. As a future work, we will design
an efficient TM which integrates these trust management
techniques in order to achieve overall network security.
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